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Ethnic inequality in retirement income: a
comparative analysis of immigrant–native
gaps in Western Europe
JAN PAUL HEISIG*, BRAM LANCEE† and JONAS RADL‡
ABSTRACT
Previous research unequivocally shows that immigrants are less successful in the
labour market than the native-born population. However, little is known about
whether ethnic inequality persists after retirement. We use data on  Western
European countries from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC, –) to provide the first comparative study of ethnic
inequalities among the population aged  and older. We focus on the retirement
income gap (RIG) between immigrants from non-European Union countries and
relate its magnitude to country differences in welfare state arrangements. Ethnic
inequality after retirement is substantial: after adjusting for key characteristics
including age, education and occupational status, the average immigrant penalty
across the  countries is  per cent for men and  per cent for women.
Country-level regressions show that income gaps are smaller in countries where
the pension system is more redistributive. We also find that easy access to long-
term residence is associated with larger RIGs, at least for men. There is no clear evi-
dence that immigrants’ access to social security programmes, welfare state transfers
to working-age households or the strictness of employment protection legislation
affect the size of the RIG.
KEYWORDS – immigration, ethnic inequality, retirement income, pension systems,
Europe, comparative research, welfare state, European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).
Introduction
Ample research shows that immigrants have less favourable labour market
outcomes than natives across the industrialised world, even after accounting
for socio-economic characteristics (Adsera and Chiswick ; Büchel and
Frick ; Lancee ). Additionally, previous scholarship documents
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that ethnic gaps vary considerably across Western societies (Büchel and
Frick ; Fleischmann and Dronkers ; Heath and Cheung ;
Kogan ). Today, however, the problem of ethnic inequality is no
longer confined to the working-age population because the immigrants
that arrived in Europe in the s and s have mostly exited the
labour market. According to Eurostat, there were almost seven million
foreign-born persons aged  or older in countries of the European
Union (EU) in . Research has yet to adapt to these changing realities:
evidence about the relative economic position of immigrants once retired
remains scant (Warnes et al. ). In particular, we know virtually
nothing about cross-national differences in the disadvantages faced by
immigrants in old age.
A small number of single-country studies suggest that ethnic inequality in
later life is substantial in Britain (Evandrou ; Vlachantoni et al. ),
Germany (Hochfellner and Burkert ) and the United States of America
(USA) (Hogan and Perrucci ). Interesting as they are, these findings
are difficult to compare because of varying income concepts, definitions of
immigrant status and methodological differences. The first objective of this
paper therefore is to document the immigrant/non-immigrant gap in retire-
ment income in  Western European countries using comparable micro
data. We focus on the retirement income gap (RIG) between immigrants
from non-EU countries and native-born men and women aged  and older.
Our second objective is to advance towards explaining cross-national vari-
ation in the RIG, something that, to our knowledge, has not been done
before. We focus on the role of the welfare state, adopting a broad concep-
tion of social rights that is not restricted to social protection, but also
includes labour market regulation and integration policy (Sainsbury
). Understanding how the welfare state shapes ethnic inequality in
old age is crucial for developing policies that curb ethnic inequality and
prevent marginalisation of retired minorities.
Our empirical analysis uses data from the European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) from the years –. The
sample comprises , retirement-age (+) men and women, includ-
ing , non-EU immigrants in  Western European countries. We
focus on the relative income gap between immigrant and native-born retir-
ees. We investigate the role of welfare state institutions using a two-step pro-
cedure. In the first step, we regress retirement income on immigrant status
and other socio-economic characteristics to obtain adjusted RIG estimates
for each country. In the second step, we model the relationship between
the estimated RIGs and measures of national institutional context.
We find that income gaps are smaller in countries where the pension
system is more redistributive. This is consistent with the idea that progressive
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pension systems benefit economically vulnerable groups such as immi-
grants. We further show that stricter access to long-term residence is asso-
ciated with smaller RIGs, at least for men. This is in line with the
argument that stricter immigration regimes result in more positively
selected immigrant populations. We find no clear evidence that immi-
grants’ access to social security programmes, welfare state transfers to
working-age households or the strictness of employment protection legisla-
tion are systematically related to the size of the RIG.
Ethnic inequality in old age
Previous work suggests that ethnic inequality in old age is substantial. For
example, in the USA, the racial income gap appears to be even larger in
retirement than during working life (Hogan and Perrucci ).
Evandrou () found that in Great Britain at least half of older people
of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin are situated in the bottom quin-
tile of the income distribution. In a Canadian study that specifically looked
at pension income, Marier and Skinner () estimated immigrant/non-
immigrant gaps of approximately  and  per cent for men and women,
respectively. In Germany, public pension entitlements of immigrants have
been reported to be about  per cent lower than those of the native-
born population (Hochfellner and Burkert ; Mika and Tucci ).
RIGs are partly a consequence of ethnic disadvantage during working life
(Bratsberg, Raaum and Røed ). Immigrants who migrate when they are
of working age have less time to accumulate pension entitlements in the des-
tination society (Ginn and Arber ; Vlachantoni et al. ). In most
pension systems, there is a close link between lifetime earnings and retire-
ment income, suggesting that delayed entry into the destination-country
labour market translates into lower retirement income. Furthermore, due
to compositional differences in education, occupational sector and other
characteristics – and probably also because of discrimination – immigrants
face greater risks of involuntary unemployment and earn lower wages than
the native born (e.g. Büchel and Frick ; Heath and Cheung ;
Kogan ). Previous studies on ethnic disparities in retirement income
confirm the importance of immigrants’ disadvantage during working life
for countries as diverse as the United Kingdom (UK) (Ginn and Arber
), Switzerland (Bolzman ) and Germany (Mika and Tucci ).
For these reasons, we control for individual socio-economic characteris-
tics when estimating immigrant/non-immigrant RIGs at the country level.
In the following section, we discuss five possible explanations of how the
welfare state affects ethnic inequality in later life.
Ethnic inequality in retirement income
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Explaining cross-national differences in the retirement income
The pension system
One potential source of cross-national variation in ethnic inequality in
retirement is the pension system. Pension systems are complex institutional
arrangements that differ with respect to the public–private mix, whether
participation in the different schemes is mandatory and other factors
(Ebbinghaus ). Previous research suggests that pension systems affect
the extent to which working-age inequalities persist after retirement. For
example, Brown and Prus () find that income inequality in old age is
smaller in countries where pensioners draw a larger portion of their
income from public sources. Public pension schemes tend to be more pro-
gressive in the sense that workers with low lifetime earnings receive higher
replacement rates than higher-earning workers (O’Rand and Henretta
). Beveridgean systems are more beneficial for low-wage earners
than Bismarckian systems (Meyer, Bridgen and Andow ). Relatedly,
Möhring () maintains that basic and targeted pension schemes,
which guarantee a basic pension to everyone who meets minimal require-
ments, mitigate disadvantages from discontinuous employment careers.
Price et al. () show that non-means-tested disability benefits can be
crucial in keeping otherwise poor social groups above the poverty line.
Existing research has also stressed the role of private pensions for RIGs
(Ginn and Arber ).
One important aspect that affects the progressivity of a pension system is
the extent to which benefit criteria penalise short employment histories.
Most public pension schemes require a minimum contribution period for
pension eligibility. Furthermore, while some systems consider only short
periods of time for benefit calculation (e.g. it used to be the final five
years in Greece), others calculate the relevant earnings measure as a life-
time average (Whitehouse ). Regulations of the latter type likely are
detrimental to immigrants, who tend to have shorter contribution
periods, partly because of their later entry into the destination country’s
labour market and partly because of their higher unemployment risks com-
pared to the majority population.
Given that immigrants tend to have lower lifetime earnings and
more fragmented careers than the native-born population, the redistri-
bution hypothesis posits that immigrants benefit from equalising pension
systems:
. Hypothesis : Ethnic inequality in retirement income is smaller in coun-
tries with more redistributive pension systems.
 Jan Paul Heisig et al.
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Integration policy
The term ‘integration policy’ broadly refers to policies that regulate the rights
and opportunities of immigrants in the destination country (Helbling ).
Integration policies comprise cultural, political and citizenship rights, on the
one side, and policies for equal opportunities on the labour market and the
welfare state, on the other (Koopmans ). For immigrants’ pension
incomes, important policies are those that govern access to social insurance
programmes and especially to public pension schemes and means-tested
benefits for older people (Sainsbury ). If eligibility to these programmes
is tied to country of birth, citizenship status or length of residence in the host
country, immigrants will have only limited access, which should depress their
retirement income (Dörr and Faist ). The access to social security hypothesis
therefore expects the following relationship:
. Hypothesis : Ethnic inequality in retirement income is smaller in coun-
tries that grant immigrants full access to social security and public pensions.
Immigration policy
A more pessimistic view on immigrant-friendly policies stresses the risk of
adverse selection: generous immigration regimes, the argument goes,
attract less productive immigrants. It is well-established that the composition
of immigrant populations differs across countries (Büchel and Frick ;
Koopmans ). According to the selective immigration perspective, easy
access to permanent residence, especially if combined with generous
welfare arrangements (see below), attracts immigrants with low human
capital, low motivation and other unfavourable characteristics (Koopmans
). Thus, liberal residence regulations would attract immigrants with
weaker labour market opportunities who will eventually receive low pension
benefits, resulting in larger RIGs. By contrast, strict residence requirements
positively select immigrants, raising average attainment levels and old-age
incomes. We hence formulate the following selective immigration hypothesis:
. Hypothesis : Stricter long-term residence requirements are associated with
smaller retirement income gaps between immigrants and non-immigrants.
Social spending
A related argument claims that generous welfare state transfers attract less-
productive immigrants and, once arrived, give them little incentive to invest
in human capital and ‘work hard’ in order to improve their labour market
prospects. As Nannestad (: ) puts it: ‘if the difference between
income earned from working and income from social transfers is not
Ethnic inequality in retirement income
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enough to outweigh the individual immigrant’s cost of integration, the
rational choice… is not to integrate and work but to live off social transfers’.
According to this line of reasoning, generous welfare states exacerbate
ethnic inequalities during working life, which eventually spill over into
retirement, resulting in larger RIGs.
Adverse selection and moral hazard effects could conceivably also
emanate from more redistributive pension systems and other transfer pro-
grammes for older people (which would work against confirmation of
Hypothesis ). However, one would expect moral hazard to be much stron-
ger for benefits that are available to working-age individuals, because it is in
this phase of the lifecourse when migration decisions and career choices are
made. Thus, the moral hazard hypothesis reads as follows:
. Hypothesis : Higher public spending on social transfers to working-age
individuals is associated with larger retirement income gaps between
immigrants and non-immigrants.
Labour market rigidity
Kogan () argues that strict employment protection exacerbates ethnic
penalties on the labour market by increasing hiring/firing costs and making
employers more risk averse. Employers would therefore ‘more readily act on
prejudices’ (Kogan : ) and (statistically) discriminate against immi-
grants. In a sample of Western European countries, Kogan () indeed
found immigrants’ relative unemployment risk to be positively related to
employment protection legislation (EPL), suggesting that strict employ-
ment protection fosters insider–outsider divides between immigrants and
the majority population. However, for immigrant youth in Western
Europe, Lancee () did not find an association between EPL and rela-
tive unemployment risk. If EPL negatively affects the labour market pro-
spects of immigrants, their continued disadvantage on the labour market
should accumulate over the working life and amplify the RIG. Thus, the
labour market rigidity hypothesis posits the following relationship:
. Hypothesis : Immigrants’ retirement income disadvantage is larger in
countries with stricter employment protection.
Data and methods
Data and sample
We use the EU-SILC for the years –. EU-SILC is the main data
source for the EU to monitor poverty and social inclusion. It has a large
 Jan Paul Heisig et al.
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sample size and contains detailed information on pension incomes. Our
analytic sample consists of all persons who are  years or older. We
analyse men and women separately because of marked country differences
in female labour force attachment and gender-specific retirement behav-
iour (Radl ). Following most of the literature on immigrant penalties,
we concentrate on non-EU immigrants because they tend to be (much)
more disadvantaged than EU immigrants (Adsera and Chiswick ).
Moreover, integration and immigration policies primarily regulate the
rights of non-EU immigrants. We thus exclude immigrants born in EU
member states from our analysis. The final sample consists of , male
and , female immigrants born in non-EU countries and of ,
native-born men and , women in  Western European countries.
For about  per cent of our sample, we lack information on at least one
of the variables. To fill in these missing values we apply multiple imputation
(ten imputations) via chained equations (Royston ). For details on the
imputation procedure, see section S in the online supplement.
Analytic strategy
We measure RIGs in Western Europe and relate their size to institutional
factors. We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the immi-
grant/non-immigrant RIG by fitting a Generalised Linear Model of retire-
ment income with a log link and Gaussian error distribution to each of
the  country samples. The coefficients on a dummy variable for immi-
grant status provide our estimates of the RIG (in log points). The models
control for survey year, age, education, occupational status (in the last or
current job), being self-employed or not in the last or current job, and a
dummy for never having worked. All estimations use the provided survey
weights. For easier interpretation, we sometimes convert coefficient esti-
mates into percentage terms by applying the transformation (eb – ) ×
, where b denotes the coefficient estimate.
In the second step, we regress the estimated RIGs on country-level predic-
tors. This two-step procedure is an alternative to hierarchical (mixed-
effects) linear models (Heisig, Schaeffer and Giesecke ). It readily
accommodates more flexible analyses in the first, within-country step and
allows the coefficients of all lower-level variables to vary across countries.
Because of differences in sample sizes and other factors, the reliability of
the estimated income gaps varies across countries. We therefore estimate
the country-level regressions using a Feasible Generalised Least Squares
approach that gives greater weight to more reliable estimates (Lewis and
Linzer ).
Ethnic inequality in retirement income
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0144686X17000332
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin / WGL, on 31 Aug 2018 at 10:21:29, subject to the Cambridge
Individual-level variables
Our dependent variable is retirement income (‘old-age benefits’ in EU-SILC;
variable PYG/PYN), which ‘cover[s] benefits that: provide a replace-
ment income when the aged person retires from the labour market, or guar-
antee a certain income when a person has reached a prescribed age’
(Eurostat : ). Old-age benefits include all public (first-pillar) and,
if applicable, occupational (second-pillar) benefits that are not means-
tested (for further details, seeGoedeme ). To limit the influence of out-
liers, we cap observations at the th percentile.
For all but four countries, income is reported in gross (i.e. pre-tax) terms.
In France, Greece, Italy and Sweden, retirement income is recorded net of
income tax and social security contributions. Because income taxation tends
to be progressive, RIGs are likely somewhat smaller after taxation. For the
 countries that recorded retirement income in gross terms, the estimated
gaps might therefore slightly overstate inequalities relative to post-tax (dis-
posable) income. However, the country-level associations that we find are
robust when accounting for these differences (see the section ‘Sensitivity
analysis’).
The focal predictor in the first-stage regressions is immigrant status which
takes the value  if a respondent was born in a non-EU country and  if he
or she was born in the survey country. We additionally include the following
controls: survey year; age (four groups: –, –, –, +); educational
attainment (a coarsened version of the  International Standard
Classification of Education, ISCED: –, –, –); occupational status (last/
current job’s score on the International Socio-Economic Index of
Occupational Status; Ganzeboom, DeGraaf and Treiman ); an indicator
for self-employment in the last/current job; an indicator for never having worked.
Due to anonymisation, EU-SILC data do not allow us to further differen-
tiate non-EU immigrants by their country of origin. However, by controlling
for education and occupational status, we account for differences in the
socio-economic composition of different immigrant groups.
Country-level variables
Pension redistribution index. The pension redistribution index is con-
structed by standardising and summing two indicators. The first, from
Whitehouse (), refers to the degree of distribution implied by
benefit rules for the first (public) pillar and any mandatory second (occupa-
tional) pillar. Higher values indicate more redistribution in the sense that
the link between lifetime earnings and retirement benefits is weaker. In par-
ticular, ‘a pure basic scheme [with flat-rate pensions] scores  per cent
 Jan Paul Heisig et al.
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and a pure insurance scheme [with pensions being proportional to earn-
ings], zero’ (Whitehouse : ). The measure assumes a . per
cent return rate and a full working career (from labour market entry at
age  in  until the standard retirement age in each country). It there-
fore does not reflect country differences in penalties for short careers,
which are captured by the second indicator extracted from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Pension Calculator: the reduction in net pension wealth (as a percentage)
for a worker who enters the labour market in  at age  rather than age
 and works until retirement age (OECD b). It is important to stress
that this measure refers to the benefit reduction associated with having
fewer years of contributions for a worker retiring at the full retirement
age. It does not capture penalties for early benefit take-up (i.e. before the
standard retirement age), which have been raised substantially in many
countries during recent decades. Larger reductions imply larger penalties
for short contribution histories (less redistribution), so we reverse-code
this measure for the composite index. For men and women, we separately
calculate the penalty measures for workers earning ,  and  per
cent of the national average and average the three values.
While the measures underlying the pension redistribution index are the
most appropriate we could find, they are not ideal. In particular, there is a
mismatch between the birth cohorts that we study and the considerably
younger birth cohorts that the pension measures refer to. Fortunately,
while most countries have reformed pension policy quite substantially
during recent decades, none of the countries that we study has, to our
knowledge, dramatically modified the overall extent of progressivity, with
many changes essentially being across-the-board benefit cuts. To the
extent that reforms have altered the extent of redistribution, they have
largely worked in the same direction. As the OECD (: ) concludes:
‘While future pensions will decline across the earnings range, most coun-
tries have protected the lowest earners from benefit cuts; everywhere,
except in Sweden, pension reforms will hit the highest earners most’.
Thus, while our measure might overstate the extent of progressivity for
the birth cohorts that we study, this bias likely is similar across countries.
This suggests that the redistribution index accurately captures country differ-
ences in the extent of progressivity for the cohorts that we study, which is
sufficient for estimating the relationship between progressivity and the RIG.
Equal access to social security. This measure is a sub-dimension of the
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX; Niessen, Huddleston and
Citron ), which measures whether non-EU nationals have equal
access to unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, invalidity benefits,
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maternity leave, family benefits and social assistance (based on expert
ratings). A score of  indicates equal treatment of nationals and non-
EU nationals. Scores of  and  mean that treatment is unequal in one
or more than one area, respectively. MIPEX provides values for  and
. We differentiate between countries that received scores of  in
both years (‘full access to social security’) and countries that received a
score of  or  in at least one of these years (‘less than full access to
social security’). This is a relatively crude measure of access to social secur-
ity, especially since it is partly based on access to programmes that are not
(primarily) targeted at older people. However, no better measure is avail-
able. The detailed expert comments underlying the scoring suggest that it
does capture relevant country differences, albeit likely with some error.
Strictness of residence requirements. To measure the selectivity of immigra-
tion policies we use another MIPEX indicator entitled ‘conditions for acqui-
sition of long-term residence status’. This indicator comprises detailed
expert scores on language requirements and accounts for whether tests
are conducted by specialists. It also covers requirements for economic
resources (in particular, whether employment is a precondition for long-
term residence) and the cost and length of the application procedure.
We average scores from  and , with higher values indicating stric-
ter conditions.
Public spending on social programmes. This variable is total public expend-
iture on unemployment/family/housing as a percentage of a country’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Adema, Fron and Ladaique ). We
include spending on housing and family benefits because their effect on
work incentives is arguably similar to that of unemployment benefits. To
capture spending patterns when the cohorts that we study were working-
aged, we use values from  or the earliest available later value.
Employment protection index. This measure is taken from the OECD data-
base on EPL. We use the index measuring protection against individual dis-
missals for workers with permanent contracts. Because we are interested in
labour market regulation when persons in our sample were working-aged,
we use the  value for all countries except Luxembourg, where the
first available value refers to .
Age at immigration. To account for cross-national differences in migration
history, all country-level regressions control for average age at immigration
for the immigrant population under study (i.e. men or women aged +,
who were born in a non-EU country). It is not possible to include this
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covariate at the individual level, because EU-SILC only provides it from
 onward. Unavailability of age at immigration for earlier waves also
leaves very few cases for estimating the average age. Hence, applying the
same definitions and sample restrictions, we also calculated average age at
immigration using the European Social Survey (–) and the EU
Labour Force Survey (–). For each gender, we calculate the
final variable as the average (weighted by sample size) of the values from
the three sources.
Tables  and  show individual-level descriptive statistics for men and
women, respectively. Table  displays the values of the country-level variables.
Results
Panel -I in Figure  summarises the country-specific first-stage regressions
for men; panel -I in Figure  shows the same for women. The main
purpose of these models is to obtain country-specific RIG estimates,
adjusted for socio-economic characteristics. For easier interpretation, we
present all coefficient estimates in percentages.
Point estimates for the individual-level variables are largely in line with
existing research (Blossfeld, Bucholz and Kurz ; Hogan and Perrucci
; Möhring ). Before we turn to the RIGs, we briefly discuss the
control variables. The age dummies mostly show positive effects of belong-
ing to an older age group as compared to age –; this may reflect cohort
differences in working careers and/or pension generosity (Heisig ).
Cross-national variation in the age effect likely also captures differences in
(statutory) pension ages; which would explain the large coefficients
obtained for Norway that has historically had high pensionable ages. The
positive effects of both educational attainment and occupational status
are consistent with a standard earnings equation. Former self-employed
workers have lower old-age incomes (except for females in Luxembourg).
Given that our outcome variable mostly comprises public pension
benefits, this seems straightforward. As one would expect, the effect of
never having worked is negative for women; for men, the pattern is more
erratic, partly reflecting the rareness of these cases.
Altogether, panels -I and -I largely show the expected results for all
covariates. Considerable cross-country variation in the magnitude of coeffi-
cients underpins the need for an estimation procedure that accommodates
such variation. This is one of the virtues of our two-stage regression
approach (Heisig, Schaeffer and Giesecke ).
Panels -II and -II visualise estimated RIGs in greater detail. Squares
depict the difference (as a percentage) in mean retirement income
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Austria , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Belgium , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Denmark , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Finland , . . . . . . . . . . ,
France , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Greece , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Ireland , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Italy , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Luxembourg , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Netherlands , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Norway , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Portugal , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Spain , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Sweden , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Switzerland , . . . . . . . . . . ,
UK , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Non-EU immigrants:
Austria , . . . . . . . . . . 
Belgium , . . . . . . . . . . 
Denmark , . . . . . . . . . . 
Finland , . . . . . . . . . . 
France , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Greece , . . . . . . . . . . 
Ireland , . . . . . . . . . . 
Italy , . . . . . . . . . . 
Luxembourg , . . . . . . . . . . 
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Norway , . . . . . . . . . . 
Portugal , . . . . . . . . . . 
Spain , . . . . . . . . . . 
Sweden , . . . . . . . . . . 
Switzerland , . . . . . . . . . . 
UK , . . . . . . . . . . 
Notes: Values are averages across ten imputations. ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education. ISEI: International Socio-Economic Index of
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Austria , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Belgium , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Denmark , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Finland , . . . . . . . . . . ,
France , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Greece , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Ireland , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Italy , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Luxembourg , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Netherlands , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Norway , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Portugal , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Spain , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Sweden , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Switzerland , . . . . . . . . . . ,
UK , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Non-EU immigrants:
Austria , . . . . . . . . . . 
Belgium , . . . . . . . . . . 
Denmark , . . . . . . . . . . 
Finland , . . . . . . . . . . 
France , . . . . . . . . . . ,
Greece , . . . . . . . . . . 
Ireland , . . . . . . . . . . 
Italy , . . . . . . . . . . 
Luxembourg , . . . . . . . . . . 
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Norway , . . . . . . . . . . 
Portugal , . . . . . . . . . . 
Spain , . . . . . . . . . . 
Sweden , . . . . . . . . . . 
Switzerland , . . . . . . . . . . 
UK , . . . . . . . . . . 
Notes: Values are averages across ten imputations. ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education. ISEI: International Socio-Economic Index of
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Austria −. −. −. −. Full . . . . .
Belgium −. −. . . Not full . . . . .
Denmark −. −. . . Not full . . . . .
Finland −. −. −. −. Not full . . . . .
France −. −. −. −. Full . . . . .
Greece −. −. −. −. Full . . . . .
Ireland −. −. . . Full . . . . .
Italy −. −. −. −. Full . . . . .
Luxembourg −. −. −. −. Not full . . . . .
Netherlands −. −. −. −. Full . . . . .
Norway −. −. . . Not full . . . . .
Portugal −. −. . . Full . . . . .
Spain −. −. −. . Full . . . . .
Sweden −. −. −. −. Full . . . . .
Switzerland −. −. . . Not full . . . . .
UK −. −. . . Not full . . . . .
Mean −. −. . . – . . . . .
SD . . . . – . . . . .
Notes: Retirement income gap (RIG) is based on gender- and country-specific regressions that adjust for age, level of education, never having worked,
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Figure . Individual-level covariates predicting retirement income in  countries, men aged
 + .
Notes: The upper panel shows point estimates for all countries, labelling only the lowest and
highest value to preserve readability. The lower panel shows the estimates for ‘Born in non-EU
country (retirement income gap (RIG)’ in more detail. The estimated intercepts and
coefficients on the survey year dummies are omitted from the figures. EU: European Union.
ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education. ISEI: International Socio-Economic
Index of Occupational Status. DK: Denmark. FI: Finland. IE: Ireland. LU: Luxembourg. NL:
Netherlands. NO: Norway. PT: Portugal. SE: Sweden.
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Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0144686X17000332
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin / WGL, on 31 Aug 2018 at 10:21:29, subject to the Cambridge
Figure . Individual-level covariates predicting retirement income in  countries, women aged
 + .
Notes: The upper panel shows point estimates for all countries, labelling only the lowest and
highest value to preserve readability. The lower panel shows the estimates for ‘Born in non-EU
country (retirement income gap (RIG)’ in more detail. The estimated intercepts and
coefficients on the survey year dummies are omitted from the figures. EU: European Union.
ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education. ISEI: International Socio-Economic
Index of Occupational Status. BE: Belgium. DK: Denmark. FI: Finland. FR: France. GR: Greece.
LU: Luxembourg. NO: Norway. PT: Portugal. SE: Sweden. CH: Switzerland.
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between immigrants and native-born individuals, controlling for the vari-
ables listed in the top panel and for survey year. Vertical bars represent
 per cent confidence intervals. Figure -II shows that male immigrants
have lower retirement income than native-born men in all  countries.
The gap is statistically significant (at the % level or better) in  of the
 countries. The average gap equals  per cent, but cross-national vari-
ation is substantial: it is largest in Finland, Spain, Luxembourg and
Belgium (with gaps greater than  per cent) and smallest (and statistically
insignificant) in Denmark, Norway and Ireland. Figure -II shows a similar
picture for women. Immigrant women have lower retirement income in all
countries, and the difference is statistically significant in all but four coun-
tries. The average gap amounts to  per cent. With values above  per
cent, gaps are largest among females in Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium.
Disparities are smallest (<%) in France, the UK, the Netherlands,
Ireland and Austria. In sum, Panels -II and -II indicate that non-EU immi-
grants aged  and older have substantially lower retirement income than
comparable native-born individuals in most Western European countries.
The size of the ‘immigrant penalty’ varies considerably across countries.
There is no obvious regional or welfare regime clustering, although gaps
tend to be large in Southern European countries, especially for women.
We now explore if the institutional factors discussed above can account
for cross-country differences in the size of the immigrant penalty.
Figures  and  present the results of the country-level regressions. The
corresponding coefficient estimates can be found in the online supplement.
Each panel focuses on one country-level predictor and contains five coeffi-
cient estimates. The first specification only controls for average age at immi-
gration (AAI); the next four contain the focal predictor together with one of
the other covariates and AAI. All country-level predictors except the dichot-
omous variable for full access to social security are standardised (mean of ,
standard deviations of ). Estimates thus give the predicted change in the
RIG (in log points) associated with a standard deviation increase in the
focal predictor. Negative coefficients imply that a variable is associated
with lower retirement income among immigrants compared to the native-
born population (i.e. with a larger gap). Positive coefficients indicate that
the gap narrows as the covariate increases.
Figure  presents results for men. Panel -I shows coefficient estimates for
the pension redistribution index. As predicted by Hypothesis , redistribu-
tive pension systems are associated with smaller RIGs. In most specifications,
the coefficient is statistically significant at the  per cent level or better.
According to the point estimates, the RIG decreases by approximately 
log points as the progressivity index increases by one standard deviation.
The one exception is the model that additionally includes strictness of
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Figure . Welfare state characteristics predicting retirement income gaps (RIGs) in Western
European countries, men aged  + .
Notes: Dependent variable is the RIG in log points, adjusted for age, level of education, never
having worked, occupational status (last/current job), self-employment (last/current job), and
survey year. Coeff.: coefficient.
 Jan Paul Heisig et al.
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Figure . Welfare state characteristics predicting retirement income gaps (RIGs) in Western
European countries, women aged  + .
Notes: Dependent variable is the RIG in log points, adjusted for age, level of education, never
having worked, occupational status (last/current job), self-employment (last/current job) and
survey year. Coeff.: coefficient.
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residence requirements. Here, the effect of the redistribution index is
smaller (but remains substantial at . log points) and just off significance
at the  per cent level.
Figure  reports coefficient estimates from the country-level regressions
where the dependent variable is the RIG in log points. For an easier inter-
pretation of the effect sizes, we also calculated the predicted RIG as a per-
centage for different values of the pension redistribution index, with all
other country-level predictors in the model set to their means (continuous
predictors) or to the reference category (access to social security). For
example, when only the average age at immigration is additionally included
in the model, the predicted RIG for men shrinks from −. to −. per
cent as the redistribution index increases from its sample mean of  (corre-
sponding with Spain) to its maximum value of . (Ireland).
Returning to Figure , panel -II provides no clear evidence that the RIG is
systematically associated with access to social security for non-EU nationals.
Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis . Panel -III indicates that the diffi-
culty of obtaining long-term residence rights is positively associated with
immigrants’ relative income position in old age. This is consistent with
Hypothesis , supporting the idea that stricter residence requirements lead
to a positively selected immigrant population. All point estimates are statistic-
ally significant. Depending on the specification, they imply that the RIG
declines by – log points for each standard deviation increase in strictness
of residence requirements. Again using the model with average age at immi-
gration as the only further predictor, this corresponds to a decrease from
−. per cent when the strictness index is at its mean of . (close to the
Finnish, Irish and Portuguese values) to −. per cent when it is at its
maximum of . (Switzerland). Note that this effect is substantial, even
though the selectivity of the immigrant population is partly captured by
adjusting for socio-economic characteristics in the first-stage regressions (see
also Büchel and Frick ). Indeed, estimated effects are even larger,
when the first-stage regressions only adjust for age and survey year.
Spending on social transfers to working-age individuals for men does not
engender the moral hazard effects hypothesised in Hypothesis ; most esti-
mated coefficients do not even point in the expected direction (panel -IV).
Likewise, the effect of employment protection legislation is small in size and
statistically insignificant (panel -V). An explanation for these null findings
could be that by controlling for education and especially occupational
status, we adjust for the main channel through which these factors
operate, namely ethnic inequalities during working life. However, there is
still no clear support for either hypothesis when we only adjust the RIG
for age and survey year in the first-stage regressions (for the exact estimates,
see Table S in the online supplement).
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In Figure , we follow the same estimation strategy for women’s RIGs. As
in the case of men, the effect of the pension redistribution index is positive.
For women, estimated effects are even larger and mostly significant at the 
per cent level: depending on the specification, a standard deviation increase
is associated with a reduction in the RIG by – log points. This unam-
biguously indicates that, consistent with Hypothesis , older immigrants are
less disadvantaged in countries with markedly redistributive pension
systems. As with men, there is no clear support for Hypothesis : point esti-
mates for the full access to social security dummy (panel -II) have the
expected sign, but are imprecise.
Hypothesis , which expects smaller RIGs in countries with stricter
immigration policies, is not empirically supported for women: while coeffi-
cient estimates in panel -III generally have the expected sign, they are
not statistically significant. Again, however, one should be aware that the
selectivity of the immigrant population is partly controlled in the first-
stage regressions. When the first-stage regressions do not adjust for educa-
tion or occupational status, strictness of residence requirements is mostly
statistically significant (for the exact estimates, see Table S in the online
supplement).
In contrast to what the moral hazard hypothesis predicted (Hypothesis ),
all coefficient estimates of social spending are positive (panel -IV), here-
with clearly rejecting Hypothesis . Finally, there is partial empirical
support for the labour market rigidity hypothesis (Hypothesis , panel -
V), with two specifications showing the hypothesised negative effect of
employment protection legislation. However, the effect is considerably
weaker in Model , which also includes the pension redistribution index,
the most consistent predictor of the RIG.
Sensitivity analysis
We have carried out extensive sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of
the country-level results presented in Figures  and . We briefly describe
these checks and how they affected the estimated country-level relation-
ships. The complete results are reported in the online supplement.
In a first analysis, we only adjust for age and survey year in the first-stage
regressions (Tables S and S in the online supplement). The substantive
conclusions remain the same as in the main analysis. If anything, these esti-
mates provide stronger support for the selective immigration hypothesis:
once we do not control for compositional differences in terms of education
and occupational status (which should be endogenous to the selectivity of
immigration policies), the effect of the strictness of residence requirement
is larger.
Ethnic inequality in retirement income
Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0144686X17000332
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin / WGL, on 31 Aug 2018 at 10:21:29, subject to the Cambridge
Second, we use a more comprehensive income measure (augmented
non-earned income) that also incorporates private pension income,
capital income and public transfers other than pensions (Tables S and
S in the online supplement). This sensitivity check addresses concerns
regarding the harmonisation of the EU-SILC pension benefit variable that
we use in the main analysis (cf. Goedeme ). The more comprehensive
income measure likely also incorporates potential pension income from
other countries, which may not be included in the EU-SILC pension
income variable. Reassuringly, results based on augmented non-earned
income are qualitatively similar to those from the main analysis.
Another concern is that using net rather than gross income for four coun-
tries might influence the estimated country-level relationships. We there-
fore estimate the country-level regressions reported in Figures  and 
with an additional dichotomous variable indicating the  countries
where we used gross income (Tables S and S in the online supplement).
Results are similar to those from the main analysis.
We also reran the analysis based on complete cases only, dropping the
(multiply) imputed incomplete cases from the analysis (Tables S and
S in the online supplement). Again, all coefficient estimates are similar
to the main analysis.
Given our small country-level sample, our final robustness check ad-
dresses concerns about potential influential outliers. More specifically, we
estimate the country-level regressions with one country omitted at a time.
Results suggest that our main findings do not hinge critically on one of
the country cases (Figures S–S in the online supplement).
Discussion and conclusions
The objective of this study was to describe and explain how ethnic inequality
in later life varies across Western European countries. Our first key finding
is that the immigrant penalty in retirement income is substantial: averaging
across the  countries in our sample, retirement income of men born in
non-EU countries is  per cent lower than for their native-born counter-
parts, after adjusting for key individual characteristics, including educa-
tional attainment and occupational status. For women, the average gap is
similar, at  per cent. This highlights a social problem that is bound to
grow in importance as Europe’s population continues to age.
Our second objective was to relate cross-national differences in the
retirement income gap (RIG) to welfare state characteristics. While our
results are based on a cross-sectional country-comparative design and
should not readily be given a causal interpretation, they do suggest that
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welfare states shape the immigrant penalty in retirement income through
both social and immigration policies.
There is robust support for the redistribution hypothesis (Hypothesis
): for both men and women, the immigrant penalty in old-age income
is smaller in countries with more progressive pension systems. Because,
on average, non-EU immigrants earn less than the native-born population
(Büchel and Frick ), they benefit from pension systems that provide
higher replacement rates for low-wage earners. Furthermore, immigrants
usually have shorter employment careers in the host society, because many
immigrate when they are of working age (and their same-age native-born
counterparts have already entered the labour market) and because their
careers are more frequently interrupted by job loss (Ginn and Arber
). Our findings suggest that redistributive public pension systems
that favour low-wage earners and do not heavily penalise atypical employ-
ment careers – like the Beveridgean systems of Ireland and the UK –
reduce ethnic inequality in later life. This finding is in line with research
on the UK showing that although the lion’s share of redistribution
occurs across people’s lifetime, the British state pension system also
reduces intra-cohort interpersonal inequality (Crawford, Keynes and
Tetlow ). The results also square well with research highlighting
the benefits of redistributive pension systems for other economically vul-
nerable groups, such as women with non-standard employment histories
(e.g. Möhring ).
While this study suggests that progressive pension schemes are an effect-
ive means for reducing ethnic inequalities in retirement, it is evident that
stronger redistribution requires either higher public expenditure or
lower replacement rates for higher earners. In many advanced economies,
high levels of public debt limit the scope for increasing spending on pen-
sions. This is especially problematic, as expenditure on pensions is bound
to grow because of demographic ageing – albeit less than many observers
seem to think, with a projected increase from . to . per cent of
GDP in the OECD area from – to  (OECD a: ).
However, if benefits are reduced for individuals with higher wages and pen-
sions, progressive pension schemes could also be achieved at zero cost.
Therefore, an important question is to what extent voters are willing to
support redistributive policies, especially if they disproportionately benefit
immigrant populations (or at least are perceived to do so). While not
fully conclusive (e.g. Brady and Finnigan ), there is some evidence
that immigration erodes support for redistributive policies (e.g. Schmidt-
Catran and Spies ).
The moral hazard hypothesis (Hypothesis ) claims that generous welfare
states undercut incentives for immigrants to work hard and integrate,
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thereby depressing their socio-economic achievement and exacerbating
ethnic inequality in old age. Our results provide no empirical support for
such an association. Support was also weak for the labour market rigidity
hypothesis (Hypothesis ), which argues that strong employment protection
creates dualistic structures where non-majority groups such as immigrants
get trapped in insecure, low-quality jobs in a secondary labour market.
Only for women is there some tentative evidence that restrictive firing legis-
lation harms immigrants’ old-age incomes.
As for the citizenship dimension of welfare states, we found consistent evi-
dence that immigration policies have long-term effects on ethnic inequality
among older men (results for women point in the same direction, but are
less conclusive). As predicted by the selective immigration hypothesis
(Hypothesis ), RIGs are lower in countries with strict residence require-
ments compared to countries with more liberal immigration criteria.
Countries with lenient conditions for acquiring long-term residence –
such as Spain, Italy and Belgium – are characterised by larger immigrant
penalties. One of the reasons likely is that they grant residence to immi-
grants with lower (average) earnings capacity. By contrast, the gap
between immigrant and native-born pensioners is smaller in countries
that have more restrictive residence requirements such as Switzerland,
Denmark or the UK. The policy implications of this result are not straight-
forward: immigrants with low earnings capacity who migrate to a country
with generous residency conditions might be worse off relative to the
native-born population in the destination country – but they might still
fare much better than they would have if they had not left their origin
country. Note, furthermore, that the immigration policies analysed here
do not include regulation regarding refugees, which are beyond the
scope of this study.
Finally, we found no clear support for the notion that older immigrants
are financially better off in countries that grant non-EU nationals full
access to social security (Hypothesis ). However, this finding might
change if better measures were available, which highlights the need for con-
tinued efforts to produce and refine relevant policy indicators.
The size of the immigrant–native gap in retirement income does not
conform to standard welfare regime typologies. However, comparative
studies of labour market outcomes among prime-aged immigrants do
not find clear regime patterns either (Adsera and Chiswick ;
Heath and Cheung ; Kogan ; Pichler ). Thus, rather
than welfare regime typologies, future research could consider additional
contextual variables. Our study suggests at least two relevant institutional
characteristics: redistribution in the pension system and immigration
policy. In this study, we have focused on individual pension income.
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However, redistribution takes place within households, too. Future research
could thus be targeted at studying ethnic disparities in household pension
income.
Our study inevitably has limitations. First, as noted above, our analysis is
cross-sectional. This makes it impossible to address empirically concerns
about unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. The observed rela-
tionships should therefore be interpreted with caution. Second, we are
unable to observe immigrants who return to their country of origin when
retired (for a discussion, see Warnes and Williams ). Although our
population of interest is immigrant retirees who remain in the destination
country, return migration may be selective. The scholarly literature is not
univocal about the dominant patterns of selection (Borjas and Bratsberg
; Van Hook and Zhang ). Our data exhibit a surprisingly favour-
able socio-economic profile of older immigrants in Western Europe that
possibly reflects negative selection of return migrants (Figures S and S
in the online supplement).
Return migration of immigrants with low pensions would bias our RIG esti-
mates downwards, implying that the values in Figures  and  are lower-
bound estimates. In other words, ethnic inequality in old-age incomes
would likely be even larger if there were no retirement remigration. It is
important to note, however, that return migration would have to be systemat-
ically related to our country-level predictors to put our comparative findings
into question. In this respect, there are even reasons why it might render our
hypothesis tests conservative. Specifically, one might expect selective return
migration of low-income immigrants to be particularly pronounced in less
redistributive pension systems where the resultant low benefits and the com-
paratively lower cost of living in most origin countries would make a return
especially attractive. Underestimation of the RIG due to selective return
migration would then be concentrated in less redistributive countries
(where we expect to find larger gaps), suggesting that the effect of redistribu-
tion may be understated in the presented analyses.
A third limitation is the crude measure of immigrants’ origin. Because we
cannot differentiate between countries of origin beyond EU versus non-EU,
we cannot properly control for the composition of immigrant populations
in terms of countries of origin. By adjusting for socio-economic compos-
ition, we partly account for important correlates of country of origin – e.g.
immigrants from more affluent countries tend to have higher levels of edu-
cation – but this is only a second-best solution. As Zubair and Norris ()
rightly argue, despite stark internal differences within the heterogeneous
group of third-country nationals, too often cultural homogeneity in ‘other-
ness’ is assumed. Unfortunately, Eurostat’s strict data anonymisation policy
forces us to disregard this issue. While the magnitude of income
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disadvantages may vary across ethnic groups, our results have to be inter-
preted as average effects for immigrants born outside the EU.
Finally, due to data limitations, we could not incorporate all potentially
relevant institutional factors as we would have liked to. One aspect where
high-quality comparative data are lacking almost completely, especially with
regard to non-EU countries, is the portability of pensions across borders
(Holzmann and Koettl ; Meyer, Bridgen and Andow ). Moreover,
we had to accept a certain mismatch between some of the macro-level predic-
tors and our analytic sample. In particular, the pension and immigration
policy measures refer to relatively recent points in time and may not perfectly
capture the regulations affecting the cohorts under study. While we are
confident that this issue does not compromise our findings, better and
more fine-grained macro indicators, including retrospective measures,
would be desirable and warrant considerable data production efforts. Not
only would such data be helpful in minimising measurement error, they
would also provide an additional source of variation – namely within-
country variation over time – that could be exploited to better understand
the role of institutional factors and infer policy implications.
In virtually all Western societies, the consequences of immigration
represent a key topic on the public agenda. The evidence presented in
this paper demonstrates that ethnic inequality in later life is substantial.
With pension replacement rates bound to decline across European
welfare states over the next decades, this likely makes older immigrants a
group facing considerable risks of old-age poverty. Recent reforms that
seek to reward long work careers (as have been enacted, for example, in
France) may further erode the relative position of older immigrants who
tend to accumulate fewer years of eligible employment due to late entry
into the destination country’s labour market and to non-employment.
Ethnic inequality in retirement has not received enough attention so far,
possibly because the issue is located at the intersection of ageing, immigra-
tion and stratification research. As a recent policy report points out, integra-
tion policies may not be effective when implemented as stand-alone
programmes (Collet and Petrovic ). Progressive pension systems
have potential for ‘mainstreaming’, that is, for addressing ethnic inequality
with general rather than targeted – and potentially stigmatising – social pol-
icies. Collet and Petrovic (: ) conclude that: ‘one of the biggest chal-
lenges for policymakers is generating evidence that mainstreamed
approaches are actually achieving their goals of better outcomes for immi-
grants’. This study provides evidence that an inclusive approach may be suc-
cessful at reducing ethnic inequality in old age.
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NOTE
 Interestingly, Canada ties (full) pension eligibility to residence requirements
despite being regarded as a prototypical multiculturalist country (Marier and
Skinner ).
 For social security contributions, such an equalising effect is less probable, as
they are often proportional to income, or even slightly regressive because of con-
tribution ceilings.
 It should be noted that the category non-EU contains individuals from both rich
and poor origin countries. Furthermore, non-EU refers to the EU border at the
time of the survey, rather than at the time of the individual’s birth.
 For example, one reason why Denmark received a score of  in  was the fol-
lowing: ‘In order to receive old age pension  years of legal residence inDenmark
is required. The size of the pension depends on the length of stay. Full pension is
possible after  years of legal residence’ (Questionnaire Comments provided in
an XLS-file at www.mipex.eu/download; accessed  March ).
 All values refer to , except for the Irish value for spending on unemploy-
ment () and the Belgian value for spending on housing ().
 Table S in the online supplement shows bivariate correlations between the
country-level measures.
 For conventional regression tables with the exact country-specific estimates, see
Tables S (men) and S (women) in the online supplement.
 All results are similar by and large when additionally controlling for current
employment in first-stage regressions. Our preferred specifications exclude
this potentially endogenous covariate.
 For technical reasons, coefficients cannot adequately be presented as percen-
tages, but for low values there is close correspondence. Figures S and S in
the online supplement show predicted RIGs expressed as percentages.
 Graphical representations of the predicted RIG for the complete range of the
redistribution index and the other continuous country-level predictors can be
found in Figures S (men) and S (women) in the online supplement.
 We provide these results in Table S in the online supplement.
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 For brevity, we do not discuss the predicted RIGs as percentages for women in
the main article; the predicted RIG as percentages can be found in Figure S
in the online supplement.
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